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It is shown that the Diósi-Penrose criterion of gravity-induced quantum collapse may be inconsistent with the 
discreteness of space-time, which is generally considered as an indispensable element in a complete theory of quantum 
gravity. Moreover, the analysis also suggests that the discreteness of space-time may result in rapider collapse of the 
superposition of energy eigenstates than required by the Diósi-Penrose criterion.  
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The physical origin of quantum collapse is a fundamental problem of quantum theory. It has been 
conjectured that the wavefunction collapse may be caused by gravity. The gravity-induced quantum 
collapse conjecture can be traced back to Feynman [1]. In his Lectures on Gravitation, he considers the 
problems of quantizing macroscopic objects and contemplates on a possible breakdown of quantum theory 
due to gravity. The idea has been developed by many authors since then (e.g. [2-5]), among them Diósi and 
Penrose presented a very specific argument and model [4-5]. They argued that when a superposition of two 
spatially displaced states of the same object will reduce to either one state or the other, although from 
different physical considerations. Moreover, they independently obtained the same criterion of 
gravity-induced quantum collapse, which is usually called the Diósi-Penrose criterion. Since Penrose’s 
argument is minimalist in conception, which relies only on the fundamental principles of quantum 
mechanics and general relativity, we will mainly discuss his proposal in this Letter.  
In Penrose’s gravity-induced collapse model [5], the collapse time formula is 
 
GEΔ
≈ hcτ                                     (1) 
where h  is Planck constant divided by π2 , and GEΔ  is the gravitational self-energy of the difference 
between the mass distributions belonging to the two states in the superposition 
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where 1Φ  and 2Φ  are the Newtonian gravitational potentials of the two states, and G is Newton’s 
gravitational constant. Although the Diósi-Penrose criterion denoted by Eq. (1) seems consistent with 
existing experiments and macroscopic experience, we will show that at least for some situations it may 
contradict the requirement of the discreteness of space and time, which is generally considered as an 
indispensable element in a complete theory of quantum gravity. This can be seen from the following 
analysis of a typical example.  
Consider a quantum superposition of two different energy eigenstates. Each eigenstate has a 
well-defined static mass distribution in the same spatial region with radius R. For example, they are rigid 
balls of radius R with different uniform mass density. The initial state is 
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where )(1 xϕ  and )(2 xϕ  are two energy eigenstates with energy eigenvalues 1E  and 2E  
respectively. According to the Diósi-Penrose criterion, we have 
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where 12 EEE −=Δ  is the energy difference, c  is the speed of light. This means that after the collapse 
time cτ  the superposition will be greatly destroyed, but long before this time the superposition should be 
very precise. Then according to the linear Schrödinger evolution, we have:  
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This indicates that the probability density ),( txρ  will oscillate with a period EhT Δ= /  in each 
position of space before the collapse time cτ . Since the radius R is much larger than the Planck length 
2/13 )/( cGLP h=  in practical situations, even when the energy difference EΔ  reaches the Planck 
energy 2/15 )/( GcEP h= , the oscillation will always happen, as the collapse time of the superposition 
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is still much greater than the period of oscillation PPP TcLEhT ≡≈= // , where PT  is the Planck time. 
Then when the energy difference EΔ  exceeds the Planck energy PE  such as PEE π2>Δ , the 
probability density ),( txρ  will oscillate with a period shorter than the Planck time PT . However, the 
Planck time PT  is generally assumed as the minimum distinguishable size of time in discrete space-time 
(see, e.g. [6-9]), and no physical change can happen during a time interval shorter than it. Thus we reach a 
contradiction between the Diósi-Penrose criterion of quantum collapse and the requirement of discrete 
space-time1.  
                                                        
1 Here it is implicitly assumed that the wavefunction collapse is mainly due to Penrose’s mechanism and predicted by the 
Diósi-Penrose criterion.  
    It has been widely argued that the proper combination of quantum theory and general relativity, two 
firm results of which are the formula of black hole entropy and the generalized uncertainty principle [6-9], 
may inevitably result in the discreteness of space and time. Moreover, the arguments show that the 
minimum time interval and the minimum length are respectively of the order of Planck time and Planck 
length in discrete space and time. For example, the minimum length can be derived from the following 
generalized uncertainty principle [7-8]: 
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Since a full description of quantum gravity in terms of discrete space-time is not yet available, and the 
formulations and meanings of discrete space-time are different in the existing theories (e.g. string theory, 
loop quantum gravity, and quantum geometry etc), here we only resort to a minimum explanation of the 
discreteness of time, namely that a time interval shorter than the shortest time is physically meaningless, 
and it cannot be measured in principle either. As a result, any physical process can only happen during a 
time interval not shorter than the minimum time interval.  
    In order to avoid the contradiction with the discreteness of space and time, the quantum collapse 
should happen more early than the Diósi-Penrose criterion requires for the above superposition. Concretely 
speaking, when the energy difference EΔ  reaches the Planck energy PE , the superposition should 
collapse into one of its branches during a Planck time scale PT , so that the probability density ),( txρ  
will not oscillate with a period shorter than this minimum time scale. Therefore, the discreteness of space 
and time will result in a rapider quantum collapse for the above superposition than required by the 
Diósi-Penrose criterion. It may be worth noting here that this restriction of discrete space and time favors 
the energy-driven collapse models (e.g. [10-13]), according to which the collapse time formula is 
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Indeed, this formula requires that when the energy difference EΔ  is about the Planck energy PE , the 
collapse time is about the Planck time PT . However, as rightly pointed out by Pearle [14], the 
energy-driven collapse models cannot consistently account for the existing experiments, as well as the 
definiteness of macroscopic objects. In fact, in the above specific example, the energy difference is also 
equivalent to some kind of difference of space-times [15]. Therefore, it is still consistent with Penrose’s 
viewpoint.  
    As we think, Penrose’s trenchant argument for the gravity-induced quantum collapse, based on the 
deep and profound incompatibility between the principle of superposition of quantum mechanics and the 
principle of general covariance of general relativity, is still valid, only his collapse criterion may be not 
right. This is not surprising, since, as Penrose had already stressed [5], although there does exist an 
essential ill-definedness of the notion of time-translation (or uncertainty in the time-translation Killing 
vector) for a quantum superposition of different space-times, the uncertainty formula Eq. (2) proposed by 
him is provisional. First, the uncertainty in the time-translation Killing vector for the superposed 
space-times is a “velocity uncertainty”, while the uncertainty denoted by Eq. (2) is an “acceleration 
uncertainty”, and their precise relationship is model-dependent. Next, Eq. (2) does not consider the 
uncertainty in the identification of the actual time coordinate for the superposed space-times, which may be 
very important in full general relativity. In some sense, the above requirement of the discreteness of time 
may relate to this uncertainty [15]. Moreover, the direct “position uncertainty” may be also relevant, 
although it does not appear in the uncertainty in the time-translation Killing vector. Thirdly, the collapse 
time formula denoted by Eq. (1) seemingly has no firm physical basis when carefully examined. The 
argument resorting to the application of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle to unstable particles or states 
only has a very limited force, as these two situations are obviously different in nature; one is within 
standard quantum mechanics, while the other is already beyond it. In particular, contrary to the 
gravity-induced quantum collapse, the decay of an unstable state (e.g. excited state of atom) is actually not 
spontaneous but caused by the background field constantly interacting with it. In some extreme situations, 
the state may not decay at all when being in a very special background field with bandgap [16]. Lastly, we 
note that the Diósi-Penrose criterion is not right in the strictly Newtonian regime [17]2, and its microscopic 
formulation is unclear and still has some problems (e.g. the cut-off difficulty) [4]. 
    To sum up, the physical origin of quantum collapse is still a great puzzle in the existing quantum theory. 
Penrose’s observation that the incompatibility between quantum mechanics and general relativity may 
result in quantum collapse is surely a promising beginning to solve this puzzle. Yet his argument still needs 
to be further refined and developed. In particular, the precise formulation of the difference of space-times 
in a quantum superposition [15, 17, 18], which results in the gravity-induced quantum collapse, still needs 
to be found. Our analysis suggests that the formulation may relate to the discreteness of space-time. 
Moreover, the analysis also implies that the discreteness of space-time may result in a rapider collapse of 
the superposition of energy eigenstates than required by the Diósi-Penrose criterion.  
 
References 
[1] R. Feynman. Feynman Lectures on Gravitation. B. Hatfield (ed.), Reading, Massachusetts:  
Addison-Wesley (1995). 
[2] F. Károlyházy, Nuovo Cimento A 42, 390-402 (1966). 
[3] F. Károlyházy, A. Frenkel, and B. Lukács, On the possible role of gravity on the reduction of the 
wavefunction, in R. Penrose and C. J. Isham (eds.), Quantum Concepts in Space and Time. Oxford, 
England: Clarendon Press, pp. 109-128. (1986). 
[4] L. Diósi, Phys. Lett. A 120, 377 (1987); L. Diósi, Phys. Rev. A 40 , 1165 (1989); L. Diósi, Braz. J. Phys. 
35, 260 (2005); L. Diósi, J. Phys. A: Math. Theor. 40, 2989 (2007). 
[5] R. Penrose, Gen. Rel. Grav. 28, 581 (1996); R. Penrose, Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. A 356, 1927 (1998); 
R. Penrose, Wavefunction collapse as a real gravitational effect. In: Mathematical Physics 2000 ed. A 
                                                        
2 Since the Diósi-Penrose criterion, independent of the speed of light, should remain valid in the nonrelativistic Newton 
Fokas et al. (London: Imperial College) 266–282. 
[6] H. Salecker and E. P. Wigner. Physical Review 109, 571 (1958). 
[7] L. J. Garay. International Journal of Modern Physics A 10, 145 (1995). 
[8] R. J. Adler and D. I. Santiago. Modern Physics Letters A 14, 1371 (1999). 
[9] L. Smolin. Three Roads to Quantum Gravity. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2000).  
[10] I. C. Percival, Proc. Roy. Soc. A 451, 503 (1995) and Quantum State Diffusion, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press (1998). 
[11] L. P. Hughston, Proc. Roy. Soc. A 452, 953 (1996). 
[12] S. L. Adler and L. P. Horwitz, Jour. Math. Phys. 41, 2485 (2000). 
[13] S. L. Adler, J. Phys. A: Math. Gen. 35, 841-858 (2002); Phys. Rev. D 67, 25007 (2003). 
[14] P. Pearle. Phys. Rev. A 69, 42106 (2004). 
[15] S. Gao, Int. J. Theor. Phys., 45(10), 1943 (2006). 
[16] E. Yablonovitch, Phys. Rev. Lett. 58, 2059 (1987). 
[17] J. Christian, Why the quantum must yield to gravity. In: Physics Meets Philosophy at the Planck Scale, 
ed. C. Callender and N. Huggett. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2001) p.305. 
[18] J. S. Anandan, Quantum measurement problem and the gravitational field, In The Geometric Universe: 
Science, Geometry, and the Work of Roger Penrose. ed. S. A. Huggett et al. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press (1998) pp. 357-368. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
domain, this result may indicate that the criterion is already inconsistent with macroscopic experience. 
